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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
 
UNITED STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4779 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALFRED STEWART, 
                      Appellant 
__________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Criminal No. 1:10-cr-00085) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner  
__________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 10, 2012 
 
Before: SLOVITER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge
*
  
 
(Filed: February 23, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Alfred Stewart pleaded guilty in the Middle District of Pennsylvania to possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.  Stewart was a 
                                              
*
The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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career offender under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”), resulting in a total 
offense level of 29 and a criminal history category VI, producing an advisory sentencing 
guideline range of 151 to 188 months.  Stewart objected to the career offender 
designation and moved for a downward departure of one criminal history category under 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1).  The District Court denied the motion for downward departure, 
but granted a variance based on pertinent 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, ultimately 
sentencing Stewart to 110 months’ imprisonment. 
 Stewart has appealed his sentence, asserting that the District Court erred by 
denying the departure motion and that he received a substantively unreasonable sentence 
despite the 41-month variance below the minimum prison term in the applicable 
guideline range.  We reject these arguments and will affirm.
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I. 
 We generally do not review the denial of discretionary departure motions.  See 
United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 2006) (“courts of appeals . . .  have 
no authority to review discretionary denials of departure motions in calculating 
sentencing ranges”).  An exception exists if the “District Court refused such a departure 
in violation of law.”  United States v. Batista, 483 F.3d 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2007).  If the 
District Court properly understood its authority to grant a departure, we lack jurisdiction 
to review the denial of a request for downward departure.  Id. 
                                              
 
1
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 The record reveals that the District Court clearly understood its authority to grant 
the U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 departure.  The District Court adhered to the proper three-step 
sentencing procedure by calculating the advisory sentencing guideline range, ruling on 
the departure motion, and considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See United 
States v. Gunter 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  In denying Stewart’s departure 
motion, the District Court articulated its reasons on the record why Stewart’s criminal 
history prohibited him from receiving a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.  
This serves as clear proof that the District Court was aware of its authority to depart.  
Therefore, we lack authority to review Stewart’s challenge to the denial of his departure 
motion. 
II. 
 A challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard.  See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  We will 
not reverse a procedurally sound sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the District 
Court provided.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
Because a sentence within the guideline range may be presumed reasonable, see Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007), it is exceedingly difficult for a defendant to 
demonstrate that the benefit given by a below guideline range sentence is unreasonable.  
See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A] within-guidelines 
range sentence is more likely to be reasonable than one that lies outside the advisory 
guidelines range.”). 
4 
 
 The District Court properly calculated the guideline range, then proceeded to 
consider the U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 downward departure motion and § 3553(a) factors when 
fashioning Stewart’s 41 month below-guideline range sentence.  The District Court 
considered Stewart’s role as a street-level dealer, the dates and weights of the drugs sold, 
the circumstances of his prior criminal history, and his cooperation with the authorities.  
Nevertheless, Stewart complains that the District Court gave too much weight to the 
career offender guideline.  The argument is unavailing.  Stewart is a recidivist with a 
prior criminal record that began at the age of thirteen and continued unabated through the 
instant offense of conviction.  Stewart’s record is comprised of multiple drug convictions, 
one of which included a firearm, a resisting arrest conviction, and a series of probation 
and parole violations.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion by varying 41 
months below the guideline range and in no way imposed an unreasonable sentence.   
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of sentence imposed by the 
District Court.    
